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Hume on the Laws of Dynamics: The Tacit Assumption of Mechanism 
 
Abstract: I shall argue that when Hume refers to the laws of dynamics, he tacitly assumes a 
mechanism. Nevertheless, he remains agnostic on whether the hidden micro-constitution of 
bodies is machinelike. Hence this article comes to the following conclusion. Hume is not a 
full-blown mechanical philosopher. Still his position on dynamic laws and his concept of 
causation instantiate a tacitly mechanical understanding of the interactions of bodies. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Hume’s philosophy of laws of nature is well known, in particular in the context of philosophy 
of religion and Bayesian confirmation theory. There is a myriad of literature on his critique of 
the reliability of reported religious miracles, and on the application of conditional 
probabilities in epistemic considerations.1 His analysis of laws has been influential in 
subsequent accounts of the metaphysics of laws. In contemporary philosophy of physics, it is 
a commonplace to introduce two rival positions on laws of nature: the Humean and the non-
Humean positions. The former position maintains that laws are records of universal 
generalizations which do not instantiate necessity. The latter maintains that laws govern and 
necessitate the behavior of objects.2 
 
In the above-mentioned contexts, Hume’s outlook (or the Humean outlook) on laws has been 
thoroughly examined. There is nevertheless one specific issue which has largely been 
neglected by Hume scholars and historians of philosophy of science. It is Hume’s position on 
the laws of dynamics (henceforth LoD).3 To remedy this neglect, this article concentrates on 
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this specific issue. It provides a comprehensive analysis of Hume’s position on LoD and its 
relevant intellectual background in the history of early modern natural philosophy. 
 
To that end, this article is structured as follows. §2 starts with a brief methodological note. 
This section indicates that we should not analyze Hume on LoD from the viewpoint of 
contemporary axiomatic exposition of the laws of Newtonian dynamics. This might lead us to 
evaluate Hume’s views anachronistically. To analyze his position properly, it is necessary to 
trace his views back to their probable intellectual sources. These are notably both Cartesian 
and Newtonian natural philosophies. §3 shows that Hume’s position on LoD is causal. 
According to Hume, causes and effects are contiguous, successive, and separable. This 
indicates that Hume’s understanding of LoD is mechanistic. §4 analyzes the extent to which 
it is mechanistic and argues that he diverges from his mechanistic predecessors such as Boyle 
and Locke. There is no evidence coming from our five senses to confirm that the hidden 
microstructure of bodies is machinelike. In Hume’s rigidly empiricist and skeptical theory of 
perception and causation, we are not licensed to infer what the hidden micro-constitution of 
bodies is, or in what relation this putative constitution is to macroscopic bodily causation. 
The closing section §5 will advance the main thesis of this article: Hume is not a full-blown 
mechanical philosopher but his references to LoD together with his concept of causation 
instantiates a mechanical understanding of the interactions of bodies. This result also sheds 
light on the issue of why Hume’s concept of causation is in tension with Newtonian 
dynamics. The reason is that Hume holds on to some pervasive assumptions of the push-and-
pull mechanical model of the universe. To agree with the results of Newton’s natural 
philosophy, he would need to discard such a mechanistic model, and replace it with an 
alternative concept of causation. 
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2. Hume’s references to the laws of dynamics 
 
Hume refers to LoD in his Treatise, in his Enquiries, and in his Dialogues.4 Before rushing 
into his treatment of these laws, let me issue a word of caution. It would be convenient to list 
Hume’s references to LoD with the aid of a contemporary axiomatic exposition. Today we 
can portray the dynamics of the 17th and 18th centuries in the form of four basic laws: 
Newton’s three laws of motion and his law of universal gravitation. In approaching Hume’s 
position, we could look at a contemporary exposition and compare it to his listing of LoD. 
However, it would be insufficient, even misleading and anachronistic, to use this approach to 
understand Hume’s position on LoD. 
 
Establishing the foundations of classical physics as we now know it took some hundreds of 
years. What the early moderns had at their hands was rather different as what we have today. 
Nowadays, when we open a physics textbook, we find a plethora of interconnected concepts: 
Force, impulse, momentum, energy, heat, power and work, to mention a few.5 There is a 
scarce number of definitions or laws from which these concepts can be derived from. 
Different dynamic notions have precise meanings, and they are clearly related to each other. 
 
It would be a momentous task to figure out how exactly our present exposition of classical 
physics differs from (or agrees with) early modern natural philosophy. This is not my task in 
this article. Here it suffices to say that the list of propositions concerning physical laws in the 
early modern world was not the exact same list as we have today. There were still some 
serious debates between the Cartesians and the Newtonians about how to organize such a list. 
This ambivalence is also apparent in Hume. It can be explained by his education. It included 
the study of Newtonian natural philosophy with the texts of Newton’s disciples John Keill 
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and David Gregory, as well as Cartesian natural philosophy with Jacques Rohault’s textbook. 
In addition, Hume studied Boyle’s experimental mechanical philosophy.6 His overall position 
on LoD—and natural philosophy more broadly conceived—reflects both Cartesian and 
Newtonian elements. 
 
In my interpretation, Hume recognizes five LoD. He does not present them in an axiomatic 
form. This is because he is not first and foremost a natural philosopher. Hume’s ambition is 
to develop a science of human nature that is different from natural philosophy. A central 
aspect of this ambition is to provide a mental geography by mapping the cognitive structures 
of the human mind. For this purpose, LoD are irrelevant.7 There is no evidence that Hume 
has anything like an account of LoD. He does not have a settled dynamical theory that he 
articulates throughout all his works. Instead, on various scattered occasions, he refers to a 
number of laws of motion in the process of making other points relevant to his overall 
philosophical project. These references do not explicitly tell us whether Hume approves or 
disapproves of the propositions in question. Often he does not even state the propositions in 
his own voice. He instead quotes from natural philosophers or attributes them to common 
viewpoints. He does not seem to have any deep concerns about their consistency. But Hume’s 
references to LoD do tell us, or so my argument propounds, about his tacit mechanistic 
assumptions wedded to his notion of causality. 
 
In various unrelated contexts (T 2.3.8.8; SBN 434-435, EHU 7.25n; SBN 73, fn. 16, 4.13; 
SBN 31, DNR 8.11; KS 186), Hume expresses LoD as follows: 
 
I. “A body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its present state, till put from it by 
some new cause.” 
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II. “A body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires 
itself.” 
 
III. “The moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio or proportion 
of its solid contents and its velocity.” 
 
IV. “The equality of action and re-action seems to be an universal law of Nature.” 
 
V. “Gravitation of matter [...] produces a motion from the one to the other.” 
 
The fact that Hume mentions law I is neither surprising nor controversial. The law is the 
principle of inertia. I can be found both in Descartes’ and Newton’s Principias.8 In 
Descartes’ formulation, the law states: “The first law of nature: that each thing, as far as is in 
its power, always remains in the same state; and that consequently, when it is once moved, it 
always continues to move” (Pr II 37). For his part, Newton writes: “Every body perseveres in 
its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar as it is 
compelled to change its state by forces impressed” (Principia, Axioms, or the Laws of 
Motion).9 Hume discusses law I in the context where he declines Malebrancheian theistic 
occasionalism. In the Malebrancheian view, God is the only causal agent in the world. 
Malebranche thought, to quote from Steven Nadler, that “God is directly, immediately, and 
solely responsible for bringing about all phenomena.”10 Whether we are dealing with bodily, 
mental, or mind‒body causality, these are all occasions for God to cause an act of His will in 
as much it is in accordance with laws of nature (except for miracles). In Hume’s account, we 
know inductively that there are certain laws of motion. But we are not justified to infer that 
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God constantly recreates the world to prevent the dissipation of forces. Hume is simply 
unwilling to discuss the theological and metaphysical underpinnings of vis inertiae or vis 
viva. 
 
Law II is a conservation law. Hume mentions this in the same footnote of his first Enquiry as 
law I, but he also analyses a definition used in the law. Law II applies in the special case 
when the masses of two bodies of an isolated system are equal. After the impact of say, two 
billiard balls, the velocity of the object ball will be the same as the initial speed of the cue 
ball.11 III is a definition which explicates the constant, the preserved quantity in law II. 
Hume mentions law III (to be precise, III is not a law but a definition used in law II) when 
discussing the notion of mixed mathematics. In introducing III, he ponders whether applied 
mathematics is like pure mathematics, a priori and necessary, or whether its propositions are 
factual like other epistemically high-class, provable propositions.12 III says that the total 
momentum or force (Hume conflates the two) equals the bulk of the matter and the resultant 
velocity of the body jointly. Hume goes on to explain the definition in this law further. He 
writes that 
 
consequently [...] a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest 
weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can encrease the velocity of that force, 
so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist” (EHU 4.13; SBN 31). 
 
The quotation above indicates that Hume thinks that force is proportional to the product of 
the weight and the speed of a body. Charles Twardy notes that Hume probably got this 
conception from Huygens. It might be an imitation of his work which equated forces with the 
powers of “raising a weight.”13 
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IV is Newton’s third law in his Principia. Hume mentions it only in the Dialogues (8.11). It 
is part of Philo’s argument that challenges a received view according to which a divine mind 
can create matter. This argument points out an inconsistency in the view that thought might 
influence matter. Because of Newton’s third law, it was known that action on “matter” has 
“an equal reciprocal influence upon it” (DNR 8.11; KS 186). If non-material mind affects 
matter, the matter should affect the non-material mind with equal and opposite force. But we 
do not see this happening. The received view which maintains that an immaterial mind causes 
changes in the material world is hence inconsistent with the known laws of nature. 
 
Newton himself puts his third law as follows: “To any action there is always an opposite and 
equal reaction; in other words, the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal 
and always opposite in direction” (Principia, Axioms, or the Laws of Motion). On a 
superficial level, Hume agrees with Newton’s formulation. But there is a crucial aspect 
missing in Hume’s understanding. This lack of understanding is relevant in assessing the 
relation between Newton’s third law and the concept of force. Although Philo’s line of 
argument in the Dialogues (8.11) brings up the notion of interaction, Hume does not 
consistently understand the concept of force in terms of interaction. To expound on this 
difference, it is useful to quote from Max Jammer’s study of the history of the concept of 
force: 
 
The third law [...] supplies an additional important characteristic of force not mentioned 
previously [in Newton’s first and second laws of motion]: force manifests itself 
invariably in a dual aspect; it is action and reaction simultaneously. Much as business 
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transaction can be regarded both as a purchase and as a sale of the same amount, force 
can be considered as action as well as reaction of the same magnitude.14 
 
In Newton’s account, if there were just one massy particle in the universe, no forces would 
appear.15 Forces are not qualities hidden in bodies but dynamic relations among them. When 
Hume refers to the concept of force, he seems to understand it as a property of an individual 
object (interestingly, this also seems to have been Newton’s position in his pre-Principia tract 
“De Gravitatione”).16 Hume notes that force is “the unknown circumstance of an object” 
(EHU 7.29; SBN 77, fn. 17). Force fixes and determines “the degree or quantity of its effect 
[the resultant motion of a body].” The concept of force is an instrument which enables one to 
predict the change of motion of bodies. Accordingly, Hume does not emphasize the 
interactive dynamic character of forces. He does not say that forces appear among massy 
particles, or that mass is the resisting factor in acceleration. 
 
At first sight, V seems to be a rather generic description of gravitation in a two-body system. 
We might think that Hume is quoting from Newton’s Principia, as this work is the original 
publication for the argument of the law of universal gravitation.  In its original context, Hume 
is not however leaning on Newton. Hume uses V as an example of a body moving from a 
higher spatial position to a lower one due to gravitation: “There is no natural nor essential 
difference betwixt high and low” because “this distinction arises only from the gravitation of 
matter, which produces a motion from the one to the other” (T 2.3.8.8; SBN 434-5). Hume’s 
depiction here is clearly not a reference to Newton’s law of universal gravitation. But in the 
second Enquiry (6.6; SBN 236), Hume mentions a special case of Newton’s law of universal 
gravitation, as he claims that the Moon is kept “in its orbit by the same force of gravity, that 
makes bodies fall near the surface of the earth.” This makes his understanding of gravitation 
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somewhat Newtonian. There are still the following restrictions: Hume does not mention the 
direct proportionality of masses or the inverse-square proportionality of distance in 
gravitational attraction. 
 
Next, I shall proceed to analyze Hume’s causal conception of laws. In what sense are 
dynamic laws causal? In brief, the answer is that forces cause bodies to change their state of 
motion; they are the causes of accelerations. In Hume’s image of LoD, the way of relating 
force to motion is all but self-evident. An important aspect of his position is the assumption 
of mechanism. 
 
3. Causation and mechanism in laws 
 
Why does Hume think that laws are causal? To understand his position, it is necessary to 
briefly explain his “fork,” that is, his distinction between the two propositions of knowledge. 
In the fourth section of the first Enquiry,17 Hume divides “all the objects of human reason or 
enquiry [...] into two kinds”: relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas include, 
for example, the truths of pure, non-applied mathematics, such as the theorems of algebra, 
arithmetic and geometry. Relations of ideas are intuitive, or demonstrable by a sequence of 
intuitions. Propositions concerning matters of fact are causal (T 1.3.1).18 Hume makes a 
universal claim that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the 
relation of Cause and Effect” (EHU 4.4; SBN 26). Laws of physics are 
generalized causal principles, as they are informative of what sorts of 
effects (body motions) are to be expected in what sorts of antecedent 
circumstances. Reasoning concerning laws is accordingly founded on the same 
factors that establish other causal principles: association based on past 
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experience of conjunctions between types of events. In a word, LoD are causal and 
informative of how bodies move. 
 
In Hume’s analysis of dynamic laws, causal language is rampant. It should be noted that he 
does not use the concept of force in an exact way. Occasionally, he substitutes it with 
moment (momentum), power and energy. When addressing dynamic concepts like gravity, 
force, power, energy, and momentum, Hume uses active words, that is, verbs like cause, 
produce, impel, fix, determine and make. The causal analysis of laws is especially transparent 
with regard to the law and the force of gravity. The law belongs to “the most establish’d and 
uniform conjunctions of causes and effects” (T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104); the force is a cause 
“which determine[s] it [an object] to fall” (T 1.3.11.10; SBN 128); it is among “the ultimate 
causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature” (EHU 4.12; SBN 30). “The 
production of motion by [...] gravity is an universal law,” (EHU 6.4; SBN 57) as the Moon is 
kept “in its orbit by the same force of gravity, that makes bodies fall near the surface of the 
earth” (EMP 6.6.; SBN 236). The “laws and forces” of gravity govern and direct “the 
revolutions of planets” (EHU 1.15; SBN 14). 
 
It is not surprising that Hume understood dynamic laws in causal terms. Both Cartesian and 
Newtonian natural philosophies are essentially causal in their make-up. What makes Hume’s 
conception a distinctly mechanical one is his explicit constraints on causation. These 
constraints are expressed in his rules by which to judge of causes and effects (T 1.3.15). I 
shall focus on two of his criteria: contiguity and the separability of causes and effects. These 
criteria imply that Hume is, in a relevant sense, a mechanical philosopher. 
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Before making any interpretation of Hume’s commitment to, or assumption of mechanism, it 
is essential to clarify the notion of “mechanical philosophy.” The term “mechanical 
philosophy” is not a settled term. It cannot be defined by listing a few necessary and 
sufficient conditions which should be included in the definition. Rather, “mechanical 
philosophy” is an umbrella term which has various interrelated meanings. In the formulation 
of Sophie Roux and Daniel Garber,19 it can be interpreted to stand for the four following 
commitments: 
 
(1) “the general program of substituting for the “common philosophy,” i.e. the 
scholastic philosophy, a new philosophy, still to be identiﬁed;” 
 
(2) “the more speciﬁc rejection of Aristotelian hylemorphism and the correlated 
adoption of an ontology according to which all natural phenomena can be understood in 
terms of the matter and motion of the small corpuscles that make up the gross bodies of 
everyday experience alone;” 
 
(3) “the comparison of natural phenomena, most speciﬁcally the world and animals, to 
existing or imaginary machines;” 
 
(4) “lastly, the ontology associated with mechanics as a new mathematical science of 
motion, the laws of which are described as the laws of nature in general.” 
 
Hume’s concept of causation instantiates mechanical philosophy in the senses of (1) and (3), 
as I shall argue in the subsequent subsections of this article. Hume’s criterion of contiguity 
indicates that he formulated his causal philosophy as taking its model from the workings of 
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machines. This corresponds to Roux’s and Garber’s point (3). His argument for the 
separability of causes and effects indicate his rejection of the older Aristotelian philosophy of 
causation in which “effects” are included in “causes,” hence corresponding to point (1). 
Nevertheless, Hume is not a mechanical philosopher in the sense of (2), as I shall argue in the 
subsequent main section. His radically empiricist and skeptical theory of perception and 
causation does not license us to infer that bodies have a machine-like microstructure as the 
corpuscularian hypothesis suggests. I will not take a stand on (4). 
 
3.1 Contiguity 
 
Newtonian dynamics violates a core aspect of mechanical philosophy. Newton’s third law 
together with the law of universal gravitation imply instantaneous action at a distance among 
all the massy particles in the universe. No matter how long the distance, or how small the 
masses, the laws countenance instant non-mediated causal action between the particles. 
Newton could not identify any agent which is responsible for gravitational motions.20 Newton 
understood space as being an empty21 Boylean vacuum, a place which bodies fill. There is 
nothing in space which “might impede, assist, or in any way change the motions of bodies” 
(Principia, General Scholium, “De Gravitatione,” Definitions 2 and 4). Thus there is 
instantaneous action among discrete objects, although there is nothing in between them. 
 
In his Treatise, there is one central paragraph (T 1.3.2.6; SBN 75) in which Hume discusses 
contiguity in physical causation. This implies his suspicion of action at a distance: 
 
I find in the first place, that whatever objects are consider’d as causes or effects, are 
contiguous; and that nothing can operate in a time or place, which is ever so little 
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remov’d from those of its existence. Tho’ distant objects may sometimes seem 
productive of each other, they are commonly found upon examination to be link’d by a 
chain of causes, which are contiguous among themselves, and to the distant objects; and 
when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still presume it 
to exist. We may therefore consider the relation of contiguity as essential to that of 
causation. 
 
To find Hume reluctant in accepting action at a distance is not surprising. Many early modern 
scholars were generally hesitant to subscribe to long-range causal action. Galileo, Descartes, 
Huygens, Leibniz, Locke and even Newton himself thought that supposing bodies to act 
across empty space was troubling.22 Leibniz, in his correspondence with Clarke, famously 
ridiculed the notion of gravitational attraction. In his words, it is “a chimerical thing, a 
scholastick occult quality.”23 
 
Hume suggests that it is desirable to find an explanation which includes a reference to 
contiguity in LoD. If contiguity is not discovered in causal relations, it is still presumed to 
exist. Hume posits that in physical causation there needs to be contact among causally related 
bodies. In this respect, Hume lends his support to Cartesian cosmology.24 Both Hume and 
Descartes are very hesitant in accepting the existence of a vacuum. They are both plenists: 
there is no empty space independent from bodies (or at least, we have no clear and distinct 
idea of it). Descartes claims in his Principles (II 16) “that it is contradictory for a vacuum, or 
a space in which there is absolutely nothing, to exist.” In the same manner, Hume claims that 
it is “impossible to conceive either a vacuum and extension without matter” (T 1.2.4; SBN 
40).25 
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As Hume approves this part of Cartesian cosmology, there is no action at a distance across 
empty space because there is no empty space in the first place (or we do not have its putative 
idea).26 In this mechanistic model of causation, “phenomena result,” Katherine Dunlop 
writes, “from something like pushing or pulling, localized to the surface of the body.”27 
Hume is a mechanical philosopher in this sense. Bodies’ motions are generated in a way that 
is reminiscent of the way mechanical devices produce a chain of motion. This is apparent in 
the way that, for example, a water mill is used to crush grains. There is a succession of 
physical contacts among the parts of the machine. 
 
In the first Enquiry, the contiguity requirement disappears. Its absence could be interpreted as 
Hume’s shift from Cartesianism to Newtonianism. This might be in part true; the Enquiries 
are maybe somewhat more Newtonian than the Treatise. Another reason for Hume to drop 
contiguity might have been the recognition, stated explicitly already in the Treatise, that 
many entities that do not exist in space can enter into causal relations. The initial discussion 
on contiguity in Treatise 1.3.2.6 includes a reference to T 1.4.5, probably to its paragraphs 9-
12. In paragraph 10 Hume provides a metaphysical maxim according to which “an object 
may exist, and yet be nowhere” (T 1.4.5.10; SBN  235). He finds it very plausible that “the 
greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner.” There can be constant 
conjunctions between objects of perceptions “which exists without any particular place” (T 
1.4.5.12; SBN  237), and these conjunctions still count as causal relations. 
 
We are only left with speculation as to why Hume does not explicitly mention contiguity in 
his treatment of causation in the Enquiries. But I do not think that he completely gave up his 
initial suspicion of action at a distance. A perusal of the first Enquiry—with respect to his 
concept of causation, at least— suggests that he does not dismiss mechanical philosophy 
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altogether. Hume’s assumption of mechanical philosophy is apparent in many of the 
examples he provides on causality: collision of billiard balls, vibrations of strings, operations 
of clocks, strings, wheels and pendulums (EHU 4.9, 7.29, 8.13; SBN 29, 77, 87). These 
examples indicate that he is not, even in the first Enquiry, entirely jettisoning the mechanical 
model of causation. Moreover, Hume does not make the positive claim that there is causal 
action at a distance. 
 
To say that Hume is a mechanical philosopher because of his contiguity stipulation raises the 
following critical question. By contiguity, does Hume mean specifically contact action? 
Contiguity could be interpreted as meaning a “next-to” relation. For example, I am 
contiguous with my neighbor. This does not mean that I am continuously standing shoulder 
to shoulder with my neighbor. Furthermore, the meaning of contiguity is different if Hume 
understands causation to concern species of events instead of objects. An event is much more 
unspecified than an object, such as a discrete material body. An event is not localized in 
space and time in the same precise way that a body is. 
 
Even if contiguity in Hume means simply a “next-to” -relation, and even if causal relations 
pertain rather among events than objects, it still does not make his position compatible with 
dynamic causation. In Newtonian dynamics acceleration is simultaneous with the exerted 
force. Throughout Hume’s work, succession is a necessary requirement for causation (see 
especially T 1.3.2.7; SBN 75-6). Causes come before the effects in time. But such philosophy 
of causation is incoherent with Newtonian physics. Consider the following example. I hold a 
rock in my hand. I release it and it falls. In Hume’s assumption, this scenario should be 
interpreted as my releasing of the rock is an event (cause) that precedes the event of falling 
(effect). But in Newtonian physics, the gravitational attraction between the rock and the Earth 
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is constant and instant. Gravitational force is not a prior cause to an object’s effect, its 
acceleration. This suggest that there is simultaneous causality (given that Newton’s laws are 
interpreted causally, that is, if one can in the first place find a relation of cause and effect in 
them). Hume discards simultaneous causation with a reduction argument. “If every effect,” 
Todd Ryan notes, “occurs simultaneously with its cause, then we arrive at the absurd 
conclusion that there can be no causal (or indeed temporal) succession in the world.”28 
 
Even in the Enquiries causation is constant conjunction; one thing or event is followed by 
another. This is inconsistent with a causal interpretation of Newton’s laws of motion and the 
law of universal gravitation. In the relevant section of the Treatise, Hume ends up with a 
paradigmatically mechanistic statement of causation in dynamic laws. Importantly, he claims 
that impulse is the causally efficacious factor in the motion of an object: 
 
Having thus discover’d or suppos’d the two relations of contiguity and succession to be 
essential to causes and effects, I find I am stopt short, and can proceed no farther in 
considering any single instance of cause and effect. Motion in one body is regarded 
upon impulse as the cause of motion in other (T 1.3.2.9; SBN 76-7, italics of the last 
sentence added by the author). 
 
Hume’s claim that an impulse of one body to another body is the cause of motion is in 
tension with Newton’s second law of motion. Newton argues that “a change of motion is 
proportional to the motive force impressed” (Principia, Axioms, or the Laws of Motion). 
Hume’s application of the term “impulse” can only stand for mechanical contact action. This 
does not imply that impulse is the only cause of change in motion of bodies. In the first 
Enquiry (EHU 4.12; SBN 30), Hume mentions other causes like elasticity, cohesion, and 
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gravitation. They cannot be reduced to impulse. Still, the “communication of motion by 
impulse” is a particularly clear example of causality for Hume. When bodies collide, and the 
motion of the first object is communicated to the second, he cannot find anything else except 
contiguity, succession, and impulse.29 But Newton’s term “impressed force” also includes 
centripetal forces, for which gravity is an example (Principia, Definitions 4 and 5). In 
Newton contact action is not required, whereas Hume’s assumption is that physical contact is 
requisite for bodies to change their motion. Hume’s position is thus what one would expect 
from a mechanical philosopher: Forces resemble percussions rather than spatially distant 
impressions.30 
 
3.2 The separability of causes and effects 
 
In the first Enquiry, Hume claims explicitly that cause and effect are distinctly separable: “In 
a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause” (EHU 4.11; SBN 30). This claim 
suggests that Hume is a mechanical philosopher in the sense that he diverges from the 
preceding Aristotelian tradition in natural philosophy. 
 
In the Aristotelian framework, various parts of a causal process are not distinctly separable. 
An acorn is potentially a tree. In its essence, an acorn strives to grow to be a tree. The final 
cause of the process, the resultant tree, is included in the potential cause, the acorn. 
According to the mechanical philosophy, objects change their state by external causes acting 
upon them. This is, in the broadest sense, the content of Descartes’ first law: If there is to be 
any change in an object, there needs to be an external cause for it.31 In this mechanistic model 
of causation “it would be a category mistake,” Walter Ott argues, “to think that an event, or a 
mode of a body, could include its effect.”32 
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Hume’s argument for the distinctness of causes and effects follows from his separability 
principle. Briefly put, the principle maintains that separability implies distinctness. Hume 
writes: “Whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever objects 
are distinguishable are also different” (T 1.1.7.3; SBN 18). Cause and effect stand for 
particular objects or events. They are separate from each other because one can be conceived 
without conceiving the other. There is no contradiction in conceiving a cause and not 
conceiving an effect: We can “conceive any effect to follow from any cause,” Hume asserts 
(Abstract 11; SBN 650, see also T 1.3.14.13; SBN 161-2, and EHU 4.9-11; SBN 29-30). 
 
In Hume’s account, the mind has a threshold in forming ideas: there needs to be a minimum 
sensible, to wit, a simple impression. For example, I now perceive a white office desk and a 
red coffee mug in front of me. My visual perceptions of these objects evince that they are 
distinct. Their different colors enable me to decide that there are two different finite objects 
with distinct spatial boundaries. This does not of course explain why the objects are separate. 
This only raises the question of why the impressions causing the ideas are separate. However, 
this reasoning illustrates the point of why effects are not included in causes. My visual 
perceptions do not inform me whether the objects stand in a causal relation or not. Causation 
is a relation external to perceptions of objects or events. It is not included in them in any way. 
 
In the first Enquiry (4.6; SBN 29), we find a lengthy argument for refusing to include effects 
in their causes in physical causation. The example Hume uses below is very typical for a 
mechanical philosopher; motion produced in the collision of billiard balls: 
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The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate 
scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and 
consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite 
distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there any thing in the one to suggest the 
smallest hint of the other. 
 
Because of Hume’s separability principle, his position is mechanistic also in the sense that it 
is incompatible with the notion of interaction in dynamics. Consider the following scenario 
explained by Newton’s third law of motion. I press the table with my hand; the table presses 
my hand with equal and opposite force. What is the cause, and what is the effect in this 
scenario? Is my pressing of the table the cause, or the pressing coming from the table? In 
Newtonian dynamics forces are generated through interactions. Although Newton’s second 
law is the causal law and his third law is rather a law of co-existence,33 it is still difficult to 
separate the supposed cause and the supposed effect in dynamic interactions (for forces 
appear between mass points). But this is what Hume’s separability principle requires. 
 
So far, I have shown that Hume assumes a causal and mechanistic stance on LoD. In the next 
section, I proceed to analyze the extent to which it is mechanistic. I shall argue that despite of 
Hume’s mechanistic model of causation, he is not a full-blown mechanical philosopher. This 
is because he remains agnostic concerning the microstructure of matter. Most notably, he 
does not subscribe to the corpuscularian hypothesis in natural philosophy. 
 
4. The extent of Hume’s mechanical philosophy 
 
 20 
 
To reiterate a criterion identified by Roux and Garber, mechanical philosophy adopts “an 
ontology according to which all natural phenomena can be understood in terms of the matter 
and motion of the small corpuscles that make up the gross bodies of everyday experience 
alone.” This criterion is also apparent in Ephraim Chambers’ definition of mechanical 
philosophy from the year 1728. It effectively equates mechanical philosophy with the 
corpuscular philosophy. Thus Chambers defines the term: 
 
Mechanical Philosophy, is the same with the Corpuscular Philosophy; viz. that which 
explains the Effects of Nature, and the Operations of Corporeal Things, on the 
Principles of Mechanics; the Figure, Arrangement, Disposition, Motion, Greatness or 
Smallness of the Parts which compose natural Bodies. See Corpuscular.34 
 
Boyle and Locke subscribe to this aspect of mechanical philosophy, but not Hume. 
Explaining the difference between these scholars clarifies the extent of Hume’s mechanical 
philosophy. 
 
In his “Grounds for and Excellence of the Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy,” Boyle 
argues that the size, shape and motion of corpuscles, which make the “texture” 
(microstructure) of matter, determine all macroscopic corporeal phenomena. This “texture,” 
for Boyle, is the structure that is “made out of minute and insensible corpuscles” of bodies. 35 
 
Locke is very sympathetic to Boyle on this issue. In explaining the texture of bodies, and how 
it relates to experiential macroscopic causation among bodies, both Boyle (Origin of Forms 
and Qualities, section 2) and Locke (Essay IV.iii.25) compare it to human-made machinery. 
Allison Kuklok elucidates Locke’s explanatory strategy as follows: 
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…the behavior of any macroscopic body is in part a function of its internal constitution, 
for example the more or less firm cohesion of its microscopic parts. We can thus see 
how our ignorance of the inner constitutions of macroscopic bodies makes the 
seemingly simple example of macroscopic causation, the impact and motion transfer 
between two billiard balls, opaque to us. The causal upshot is in part a function of the 
unknown real constitution of the material out of which the billiard balls are made. [...] 
But as Locke’s remarks also make clear, we can provide explanations for such 
observable behavior. Such explanations take the form of hypotheses about the nature of 
a body’s hidden internal constitution. [...] Reasoning based on this kind of modeling is 
just the kind of reasoning we can appeal in explaining, say, a locksmith’s prediction 
that only one of several keys will turn a lock.36 
 
The above explanation is based on an argument from analogy. A locksmith can predict which 
one of the several keys can open a lock. In the same way, an observer can predict the 
outcome of the collisions of macroscopic bodies. Neither the locksmith nor the observer 
relying on their senses have direct empirical access to the machinery of locks or bodies. 
Nevertheless, in both cases the observable effects ensue from the hidden internal micro-
constitutions of the lock and of the bodies. For Locke, the functioning of artifactual 
machinery is therefore analogous to causal efficaciousness in macroscopic causal relations. 
Kuklok maintains that Hume adopts Locke’s view of mechanism’s concept. 
 
Kuklok might be perfectly right about Locke’s position. However, I do not think that this 
interpretation is correct with regard to Hume. In my interpretation, in Hume causal reasoning 
is founded on experience of constant conjunctions of objects or events. The information we 
 22 
 
acquire of these objects or events is provided by perceptions according to the copy principle. 
According to this principle, simple ideas in the mind resemble simple impressions, and 
simple ideas are caused by their corresponding simple impressions (T 1.1.1.1; SBN 1-2). 
There is no evidence coming from our five senses to confirm the existence of corpuscles. 
Hume must remain agnostic on whether bodies are made of corpuscles, and whether this 
putative micro-constitution of matter determines macroscopic causation. 
 
However, my interpretation does not contend that on Hume’s account we could not have the 
idea of a corpuscle (or that the copy principle makes the term “corpuscle” a meaningless 
one). Considering the traditional, Democritean atomist doctrine,37 a corpuscle is a body that 
has a certain shape, size, position and orientation. These are manifest features, all of which 
satisfy the copy principle. The features described by classic atomist doctrine or modern 
corpuscularianism are observable in the macroscopic bodies around us. In principle, a 
corpuscle is not imperceptible, and therefore it is not unconceivable. Hume states that it “is 
certain, that we can form ideas, which shall be no greater than the smallest atom of the animal 
spirits of an insect a thousand times less than a mite” (T 1.2.1.5; SBN 28). In Hume’s time 
there were no microscopes of adequate resolution to detect the hypothetical corpuscles. So he 
does not find reasons to believe in the existence of corpuscles. This is a reservation that stems 
from inadequate technology; the copy principle does not rule out corpuscles. 
 
Hume diverges from Boyle and Locke because in his rigidly empiricist and skeptical theory 
of perception and causation, we are not licensed to infer what the hidden micro-constitution 
of bodies is, or in what relation this putative constitution is to macroscopic bodily causation. 
This doubt concerning the texture of bodies arises, to quote from Graciela De Pierris, from 
Hume’s “consistent and radical interpretation of the sensible phenomenological model of 
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ultimate evidence.”38 In addition to De Pierris’ formulation, Hume’s doubt can be 
characterized as follows. For Hume, laws of nature are generalizations over regularities. He 
does not find anything that would ground these regularities, because there is no sensible 
evidence for that putative ground.39 
 
One critical question should be raised here. Boyle and Locke posit corpuscles to explain 
observable phenomena. This basic point can be framed by using a vocabulary borrowed from 
our contemporary philosophy of science: we should believe in the existence of corpuscles 
because they are an inference to the best explanation (of explaining macroscopic bodily 
causation). Does Hume’s account of causation rule out such an inference? I think the answer 
is yes. An inference to the best explanation does not guarantee an inference to the right 
explanation. 
 
Hume does not apply abductive inference like Boyle and Locke in their argument from 
analogy. This is because his account of causation recognizes that in principle any thing may 
be the cause of another thing (T 1.3.14.13; SBN 161-2, Abstract 11; SBN 650, and EHU 4.9-
11; SBN 29-30). The only way for us to have information of any causal relation is by 
experience. Hume defines experience as a memory and observation of species of objects 
being constantly conjoined (T 1.3.6.2; SBN 87). I remember having observed that every time 
I place my finger to a candle flame, I feel heat, and every time I put my hand into a bucket of 
ice I feel cold. Objects or events that stand for causes and effects need to be perceivable. So 
we know about these causal relations by experience. But we do not have the same experience 
when it comes to mechanist explanation of bodily causation. We do not perceive (even with 
the best microscopes available) the sizes, shapes, positions, or orientations of the corpuscles, 
and the way they relate to the collisions of average-size objects. We can only speculate this. 
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A speculation like this is, in Hume’s parlance, a causal hypothesis which goes beyond 
experience and should be declined (T Intro 8; SBN xvii). Therefore Hume remains an 
agnostic on the existence of corpuscles, and their putative causal efficaciousness. 
 
My interpretation is able to explain Hume’s announced dismissal of Boyle’s corpuscularian 
theory. In his History (VI, 540),40 Hume highly appreciates Boyle’s experimental work with 
the air pump. Still he goes on to denote the corpuscularian position of Boyle’s mechanical 
philosophy “imaginary”: 
 
Boyle improved the pneumatic engine invented by Otto Guericke, and was thereby 
enabled to make several new and curious experiments on the air as well as on other 
bodies: His chemistry is much admired by those who are acquainted with that art: His 
hydrostatics contain a greater mixture of reasoning and invention with experiment than 
any other of his works; but his reasoning is still remote from that boldness and temerity, 
which had led astray so many philosophers. Boyle was a great partizan of the 
mechanical philosophy; a theory, which, by discovering some of the secrets of nature, 
and allowing us to imagine the rest, is so agreeable to the natural vanity and curiosity of 
men. 
 
The nuance of the preceding quote is mostly positive. Hume revers Boyle’s experimentalism, 
and even partly his mechanical philosophy by contending that mechanical philosophy can 
discover “some of the secrets of nature.” This is consistent with the fact that Hume is both a 
supporter of the British experimental tradition in natural philosophy and, in a relevant sense, 
a mechanical philosopher. His disagreement with Boyle shows the limits of his mechanical 
philosophy: Hume does not believe in Boyle’s minute posits, the corpuscles. There is further 
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textual evidence for this interpretation. In the next paragraph of History (VI, 542), Hume 
writes: 
 
While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he 
shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby 
restored her ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will 
remain. 
 
Eric Schliesser reads the above quote as indicating “Hume’s treatment of Boyle reveals that 
he thought it was a good thing Newton falsified the mechanical philosophy.” But, he adds: 
“Hume acknowledges that the mechanical philosophy could offer some successful 
explanations.”41 Schliesser’s reading is consistent with my position: Hume discredits 
corpuscularianism and simultaneously thinks that mechanical philosophy can in part provide 
cogent explanations of natural phenomena. 
 
5. Conclusion: The tacit assumption of mechanism 
 
Regarding Hume’s position on LoD and mechanism, this article has provided two viewpoints. 
The first viewpoint is positive: Hume does indeed model his causal philosophy with the aid 
of mechanism. This is apparent in the criteria and the arguments of contiguity and 
separability of causes and effects. The second viewpoint is negative: Hume is not a full-
blown mechanical philosopher. He is agnostic on whether the hidden microstructure of 
bodies is machinelike, as the corpuscularian natural philosophy maintains. The two 
viewpoints are compatible if we accept the main thesis of this article: Hume’s position on 
LoD tacitly assumes a mechanism. 
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When this conclusion is accepted, we can also see that Hume’s position is in crucial tension 
with the key results of Newtonian dynamics. Although Hume is (and rightly so, although I 
cannot defend this claim here) traditionally been viewed as a Newtonian philosopher, his 
concept of causation is inconsistent with a causal interpretation of Newton’s laws of motion 
and his law of universal gravitation. As Andrew Janiak has it, “the mechanists,” whom, in 
this case, can be seen to include Hume, 
 
failed to recognize that they retained a residue of the ordinary image [as opposed to the 
“scientific image,” to paraphrase Sellars’ famous figure42] of the world in their 
conception of causation. After all, why should we think that all natural change occurs 
through contact action? The reason that it sounds outlandish to say (e.g.) that the Sun 
impresses a force on Jupiter is that this deviates from our ordinary experience of causal 
interactions; nothing in ordinary experience suggests that the Sun could move Jupiter. 
Thus Newton transcends the mechanist project by jettisoning the last bastion of 
ordinary beliefs about causation.43 
 
Hume still holds on to some pervasive assumptions of the push-and-shove mechanistic model 
of the universe. In this model, motion of bodies is generated via percussions. To fully accept 
the results of Newtonian dynamics—from a perspective of a causal interpretation of laws, at 
least44—one should abandon such a mechanistic model, and replace it with some other 
concept of causation. 
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